

# Project “The Interceptor”:

*Owning anti-drone systems with nanodrones*

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*Autor del libro "Hacking con Drones"*

*Ed. OxWord*



# A US ally shot down a \$200 drone with a \$3 million Patriot missile

*This will be a bigger problem as more drones show up on the battlefield*

by Andrew Liptak | @AndrewLiptak | Mar 16, 2017, 10:13am EDT



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TWEET



LINKEDIN



NOW TRENDING



Previously in DEFCON...



# Defeating Jammers

HACKING PERIPHERALS - CELLULAR 3G USB & GPS - SECURE COMMAND & CONTROL

- Remote control over SSH tunnel via 3G USB cell connection. GPS & Cellular signals are illegal to jam (see FCC regulations), making it hard to defend against this type of drone.
- <https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf>



\* Note: be sure to check upcoming FCC regulations about needing to keep drone within line of sight while flying.




# Drones as a threat

- Flying computers. (*IoT over your head.*)
- Custom payloads:
  - Sniffers
  - Jammers
  - Network Analyzers
  - 3d mapping, cameras.
  - Physical attacks, explosives.
  - ...



# Detection

- Thermal and standard cameras
  - AI to detect drone shape
  - Electronics and motor heat detection
- Characterization of drone noise
- **Detected Radio Frequency and waveform**
  - Radio signature




# “Voluntary” measures



- No-fly zone controlled by onboard GPS and Autopilots
- Real time telemetry transmission to COPS
- Give to COPS the ability to take down your drone and all “*everything will be alright*”

# Counter-Countermeasures

- Spread-spectrum
- Frequency hopping
- Use unsuspected frequencies by the jammer
- Robust protocols






# First Round: "ATROPOS"

Dron ATR

- 
- 

• WiFi



Now, what else?

***“We count thirty Rebel ships, Lord Vader...”***



***...but they're so small they're evading our tu***



# Proyect *"The Interceptor"*



# Proyecto “*Interceptor*”

- Minimum size and weight (harder to detect)
- Low budget (*no, seriously, really low*)  
~\$40 + \$20 with SDR
- Hacking capabilities
- “Resilient” control

# Vocore2



# Vocore2

## Parameters

	Details
SIZE	25.6mm x 25.6mm x 3.0mm
CPU	MT7628AN, 580 MHz, MIPS 24K
MEMORY	128MB, DDR2, 166MHz
STORAGE	16M NOR on board, support SDXC up to 2TB
WIRELESS	802.11n, 2T2R, speed up to 300Mbps.
ANTENNA	One U.FL slot, one on board antenna.
ETHERNET	1 port/5 ports, up to 100Mbps.
USB	Support USB 2.0, up to 480MBit/s.
PCIe 1.1	Supported
GPIO	>=40 (pinmux)
UART	x3 (UART2 for debug console)
PWM	x4
POWER SUPPLY	3.6V ~ 6.0V, 500mA
POWER CONSUMPTION	74mA wifi standby, 230mA wifi full speed, 5V input.

# Vocore2

- Llega soporte para LEDE, ahora reunificado en OpenWRT
- DeviceTree completo y rediseñado
- Paso del mpu9250.
- Opciones: bno055, gy953 y sucedáneos

# Vocore2: PWM

- We need to generate x4 PWM signals to control the motors
  - Hard real time constrained. Need specific HW.
- x4 channels available but only 2 enabled
- Last two overlap with UART2 function
  - Disable UART2 in devicetree
  - Enable PWMx4 in devicetree



# Vocore2: PWM in the forum

**De: Vocore2**  
Second, find VoCore2.dts in [kernel](#)  
have to understand it  
Third, enable pwm driver and you will be a good linux hacker. 😊 **evcfe**  
and the pinctrl section,  
its source. ^\_^)

Emm, this is a hard way:

First, download the openwrt source from [vocore.io/v2](http://vocore.io/v2).

# Vocore2: pinmux mt7628

```
static struct rt2880_pmx_func pwm1_grp_mt7628[] = {
    FUNC("sdxc d6", 3, 19, 1),
    FUNC("utif", 2, 19, 1),
    FUNC("gpio", 1, 19, 1),
    FUNC("pwm1", 0, 19, 1),
};

static struct rt2880_pmx_func pwm0_grp_mt7628[] = {
    FUNC("sdxc d7", 3, 18, 1),
    FUNC("utif", 2, 18, 1),
    FUNC("gpio", 1, 18, 1),
    FUNC("pwm0", 0, 18, 1),
};

static struct rt2880_pmx_func uart2_grp_mt7628[] = {
    FUNC("sdxc d5 d4", 3, 20, 2),
    FUNC("pwm", 2, 20, 2),
    FUNC("gpio", 1, 20, 2),
    FUNC("uart2", 0, 20, 2),
};
```

# Vocore2: pinmux mt7628 (datasheet)

## 3.3.18 UART2 pin share scheme

Controlled by the EPHY\_APGIO\_AIO\_EN[4:1] and UART2\_MODE registers

	4'b0000	4'b1111			
Pin Name		2'b00	2'b01	2'b10	2'b11
MDI_TP_P2	MDI_TP_P2	UART_TXD2	GPIO#20	PWM_CH2	eMMC_D5
MDI_TN_P2	MDI_TN_P2	UART_RXD2	GPIO#21	PWM_CH3	eMMC_D4

## 3.3.19 PWM\_CH0 pin share scheme

Controlled by the EPHY\_APGIO\_AIO\_EN[4:1] and PWM0\_MODE registers

	4'b0000	4'b1111			
Pin Name		2'b00	2'b01	2'b10	2'b11
MDI_RP_P2	MDI_RP_P2	PWM_CH0	GPIO#18		eMMC_D7



## 3.3.20 PWM\_CH1 pin share scheme

Controlled by the EPHY\_APGIO\_AIO\_EN[4:1] and PWM1\_MODE registers



	4'b0000	4'b1111			
--	---------	---------	--	--	--

# Power stage


- Brushed motors (cheap as hell)
- X1 MOSFET
- X1 Capacitor
- X1 Schottky
- diode



# Electrical motor behaviour



# PID tuning



# Interceptor como herramienta de hacking

- Control y telemetría por WIFI
- Protocolo RX/TX beacon Frames
- Herramientas de hacking WiFi en Vocore2
- Salto de canales sin interrupción
- Sólo se usa una interfaz WiFi en el dron
- Cifrado AES-CBC
- Hash SHA256

## Forged *Beacon Frame injection (PILOT SIDE)*

HEADER

BEACON FRAME PAYLOAD

AES-128

Header

COMMAND

INITIALIZATION  
VECTOR

Preamble  
Gas  
Pitch  
Roll  
Yaw

SEQUENCE  
NUMBER

SHA256

AP  
*"INTERCEPTOR"*



# SDR con chip de FESCO?



# ¿Preguntas?

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