

RED CS TEAM

A large, billowing red smoke or fire effect serves as the background for the text "RED CS TEAM". The text is rendered in a white, bold, sans-serif font.

Diego León
Juan Antonio Calles

\$> whoami

- Diego León
- Grado en Informática y Postgrado en Ciberseguridad
- Responsable de Seguridad Ofensiva de ZEROLYNX



OSANE
CONSUL
TING



ZEROLYNX



\$> whoami


- Juan Antonio Calles
- Doctor, Doble Postgrado e Ingeniero en Informática
- CEO de ZEROLYNX



OSANE
CONSUL
TING




ZEROLYNX




Índice de contenidos

1. Introducción
2. Un poquito de humo...
3. Monitorización & Detección
4. Compromiso Asumido
5. Tools
6. Red Teaming



Ethical Hacking services

¿Tiempo infinito?
¿Alcance?




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


Smoke...




@Bluescreenofjeff (Jeff Dimmock's)

And more smoke...



@Bluescreenofjeff (Jeff Dimmock's)

Moar...




Phishing & Payloads

LT DNS C2

ST DNS C2

ST HTTP C2

@Bluescreenofjeff (Jeff Dimmock's)



Moar...

Domain Name Search

tienda

Show Filter (About 38,513 Domains)

Domain	BL	DP	ABY	A
tiendaonline.de	182	1	2007	1
tienda-mode.de	0	0	2011	1
mi-tienda.de	0	0	2004	1
ab-tiendas.com	50	4	2002	1

Phishing & Payloads

Términos de servicio Español

Symantec

Categorías /Revisar

Solicitud de revisión del sitio de WebPulse

Comprobar otra URL

URL enviada:


http:// /

Esta URL está clasificada como un riesgo para la seguridad

Sospechoso (Suspicious)

Esta página fue calificada por nuestro sistema WebPulse

Si cree que estas categorías son CORRECTAS, [haga clic aquí](#) para



Moar...

Si cree que estas categorías son **CORRECTAS**, [haga clic aquí](#) para obtener más información sobre su política de acceso a Internet.
Si cree que estas categorías son **INCORRECTAS**, complete el formulario a continuación para que se revise la URL.

Servicio de filtrado:

Requerido

Su categoría o categorías sugeridas ([leer descripciones](#)):

Requerido

 Enviar los resultados de la revisión por correo electrónico**Comentarios y descripción del sitio (*proporcione tantos detalles como sea posible*):****Enviar para revisión**

Moar...



Domain Name Search

tienda

Show Filter (About 38,513 Domains)

Domain	BL	DP	ABY	A
tiendaonline.de	182	1	2007	1
tienda-mode.de	0	0	2011	8
mi-tienda.de	0	0	2004	1
ab-tiendas.com	50	4	2002	1



Phishing &
Payloads



Sus comentarios: [REDACTED]

Revisado: [REDACTED] 2018


Según su recomendación y después de una evaluación cuidadosa del contenido web enviado, un analista de contenido web ha recategorizado esta URL como [Tecnología/Internet](#).

Gracias,

El equipo de WebFilter de Blue Coat
filtering@bluecoat.com

 Symantec

Es importante tener en cuenta que las nuevas categorizaciones forman parte de un ciclo de actualización diario proporcionado por Blue Coat, pero que los clientes de Blue Coat deben decidir con qué frecuencia actualizan su base de datos de categorización. WebFilter de Blue Coat no conoce la programación de actualización para sus clientes. Para obtener más información, haga clic [aquí](#).



Moar...

Domain Name Search

tienda

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Phishing & Payloads

Términos de servicio | Español

Symantec

Categorías /Revisar

Solicitud de revisión del sitio de WebPulse

[Comprobar otra URL](#)

URL enviada:


<http://>

Categorización actual:


[Tecnología/Internet
\(Technology/Internet\)](#)

Última calificación/revisión: Invalid Date


Si cree que estas categorías son CORRECTAS, [haga clic aquí](#) para obtener más información sobre su



Moar...




...plz stop.



*Shorthaul C2 and SMTP infrastructure not pictured

@Bluescreenofjeff (Jeff Dimmock's)

...plz stop.




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La dura realidad



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Seguridad Perimetral



Seguridad Perimetral

Entorno hostil para el adversario



Índice de contenidos


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Simulación de Adversarios




TTP: Tácticas, técnicas y procedimientos



Concepto de origen militar: modeliza el comportamiento del adversario

Pyramid Of Pain: ¿cómo dificultar el trabajo al enemigo?



MITRE ATT&CK: modela el comportamiento de adversarios

Incluye técnicas de las diferentes etapas de la cadena de ataque:
Acceso Inicial, Ejecución, Persistencia, Escalada de Privilegios, etc.

PRE-ATT&CK™


How is the adversary
targeting you?

ATT&CK™

Adversarial Tactics, Techniques
& Common Knowledge

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Additions	Command-Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Applnt DLLs	Applnt DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	Network Service Scanning	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol

Heat Maps: Permite identificar las fortalezas y debilidades de nuestra organización



This notional depiction shows how an organization would use the MITRE ATT&CK framework to show defensive gaps against adversary activity within their network.

- Shows a high confidence in the detection or defense of an adversary
- Shows a medium confidence in the detection or defense of an adversary
- Shows no confidence, visibility, or blocking capability of an adversary

MITRE

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Case Number 15-1288

Heat Maps: permiten simular adversarios concretos

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Accessibility Features	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Application Shimming	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Applnit DLLs	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Application Window Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Command-Line Interface	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Application Shimming	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Create Account	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Execution through API	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Component Object Model Hijacking	Application Shimming	Code Signing	Credential Dumping	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Execution through Module Load	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
DLL Search Order Hijacking	Bypass User Account Control	Component Firmware	Credentials in Files	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Graphical User Interface	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
External Remote Services	DLL Injection	Component Object Model Hijacking	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	InstallUtil	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding
File System Permissions Weakness	DLL Search Order Hijacking	DLL Injection	Input Capture	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote File Copy	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation
Hidden Files and Directories	Exploitation of Vulnerability	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Network Sniffing	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Process Hollowing	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Fallback Channels
Hypervisor	File System Permissions Weakness	Disabling Security Tools	Private Keys	Query Registry	Replication Through Removable Media	Regsvcs/Regasm	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Multi-Stage Channels
Local Port Monitor	Local Port Monitor	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Remote System Discovery	Shared Webroot	Regsvr32	Screen Capture		Multiband Communication
Logon Scripts	New Service	File Deletion		Security Software Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Rundll32	Video Capture		Multilayer Encryption
Modify Existing Service	Path Interception	File System Logical Offsets		System Information Discovery	Third-party Software	Scheduled Task			Remote File Copy
New Service	Scheduled Task	Hidden Files and Directories		System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	Scripting			Standard Application Layer Protocol
Redundant Access	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Regsvcs/Regasm		System Network Connections Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Service Execution			Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder	Valid Accounts	Regsvr32		System Owner/User Discovery		Third-party Software			Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
Scheduled Task	Web Shell	Rootkit		System Service Discovery		Trusted Developer Utilities			Uncommonly Used Port
Shortcut Modification		Rundll32				Windows Remote			
System Firmware		Scripting				Management			
Valid Accounts		Software Packing							
Web Shell		Timestamp							
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription		Trusted Developer Utilities							
Winlogon Helper DLL		Valid Accounts							

CrowdStrike Falcon-to-ATT&CK Mapping – colored cells considered relevant for Gothic Panda/APT3:
Gray – not tested; Green – tested, detected; Yellow – tested, detection possible; Red – capability gaps

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Tools of the trade

The screenshot displays the Caldera Operations interface, which is a web-based tool for managing and visualizing network operations. The main features shown include:

- Operation Overview:** Shows the status as "Running", phase as "operating", and action as "execution". It also displays details such as "Operation: test operation", "Start Time: 11/30/2017, 8:38:57 PM", and "Compromised Hosts: 5".
- Operation Graph:** A circular network diagram showing five hosts: win2012dc (blue), win7x01 (red), win7x02 (red), win7x03 (red), and win7x04 (blue).
- Operation Details:** A list of 15 steps in progress, starting with "Enumerating all computers in the domain" and ending with "Creating a reverse shell on the target host".
- Monkey Admin:** A browser window showing the "Monkey Admin" interface at <https://monkeyisland-1.gc.guardicore.com:5000/admin/index.html>.
- Map Legend:** Describes symbols for red arrow (exploit), blue arrow (tunnel), gray arrow (scan), and red label (patient zero).
- Monkey Details:** Shows a "proxy" entry.
- Monkey not selected:** Placeholder text.
- Monkey Config:** Placeholder text.
- General Config:** Buttons for Load, Update, New Monkeys, and Edit JSON.
- Test Management:** Buttons for Run Monkey on Island and Kill All.
- Telemetry Feed:** A table showing two entries: a scan event at 2016-08-04 03:42:09.881000+00:00 and an exploit event at 2016-08-04 03:42:15.724000+00:00.


Central to the interface is a large red circular logo featuring a white bird perched on a wire, set against a background of concentric black lines.

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Red Teaming



root@kali: ~/Downloads/arethesebad


root@kali: ~/Downloads/arethesebad

x

root@kali: ~/Downloads/arethesebad/test

root@kali:~/Downloads/arethesebad# python arethesebad.py test/

root@kali: ~/Downloads/arethesebad 185x50



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